

# GOV 388L (37965): International Security

University of Texas at Austin, Fall 2015

Thursday 9a-12p, Batts Hall 5.102

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## Course Description and Objectives

This course helps students develop the tools necessary to conduct research on the causes of international war and peace. It is in many ways a methods course; it is less about war itself—or particular wars—than it is about how to ask and answer productive questions about war. We will focus primarily on interstate conflict, but even then we will miss a lot. Breadth, however, is not our goal: developing the skills to evaluate research on interstate war and peace and then to turn that same critical eye to one's own work are the central aims of the course.

In addition to surveying the recent literature, we will also work towards the development of student research, culminating in a research paper to be turned in at the end of the semester. Time permitting, we will throughout the semester set aside time to discuss research topics—where students can give and receive feedback on their ideas—and, if possible, we may schedule brainstorming sessions outside of class (they will, however, be purely optional). These will be important in developing your ideas, in learning how to engage the ideas of others, and in learning how to take and make use of feedback.

## Requirements

Your grade, for which I use the plus/minus scale, is determined by three elements:

**20% Participation and Attendance.** Both, of course, are essential. Read each item on the required list closely each week, and come to class prepared to pick the readings apart in excruciating detail. I want *you* to do most of the talking, not me—though I'll frequently break that dictum when I feel that discussion can be pushed in a more useful direction. This course is designed for you to learn how to work out your own ideas while engaging literatures in greater depth, to learn what good (and bad) science looks like, and to start thinking about doing your own research (that is, after all, why you're here).

40% **Review Papers (2).** Students will be required to write two 5-page papers that review and critique the assigned readings in a given week, identifying (1) the common research question, (2) answers to the question, (3) relations between competing answers, and (4) which competing explanations are superior to the others. Think of this paper as a scaled-down version of review articles you see in journals, or even as a lit review that ties them together with a specific goal in mind. One of the papers will be assigned to a given week during the first session, and students in their assigned weeks will use their paper (which is due the same day that the readings will be discussed in class) to help lead class discussion of one of the articles (chosen in consultation with me beforehand). Students are free to choose the set of readings on which they will write the second paper (and there are no presentational duties assigned to this one), but note that this second paper is also due on the same day that we will discuss those readings. Late review papers will *not* be accepted.

40% **Research Proposal.** The last formal requirement is a piece of original research, not a fully realized paper but a fully-developed answer to a carefully considered research question. In other words, you'll identify a research question, develop an answer (that is, develop a theory), and propose a research design to answer it. The research question must fall within the scope international war and peace, and whatever question you pursue requires my approval (something you're encouraged to secure early). I am open with respect to the methodological approach you choose; the key is that you choose the *best* method for the question. As you develop your project, be mindful of the structure and character of the published research we read in class, and pay close attention to the critiques we level at the readings when devising your own question, theory, and research design. It's important to be aware of what research "looks like" if you're going to produce it, just as it's important to be able to hold your own work to the standards to which you hold the work we discuss in class. Once you're done, you'll have a roadmap for executing a project that you can go on to develop into a conference paper or journal article.

## Prerequisites

Graduate standing in government.

## University and Campus Policies

1. Students with disabilities.

Students with disabilities may request appropriate academic accommodations from the Division of Diversity and Community Engagement, Services for Students with Disabilities, 471-6259, [web](#).

2. Accommodations for religious holidays.

By university policy, you must notify me of your pending absence at least fourteen days prior to the date of observance of a religious holy day. If you must miss a class, an examination, a work assignment, or a project in order to observe a religious holy

day, you will be given an opportunity to complete the missed work within a reasonable time after the absence.

### 3. Academic dishonesty.

“*Scholastic dishonesty*. . . includes, but is not limited to, cheating, plagiarism, collusion, falsifying academic records, and any act designed to give unfair academic advantage to the student (such as, but not limited to, submission of essentially the same written assignment for two courses without prior permission of the instructor, providing false or misleading information in an effort to receive a postponement or an extension on a test, quiz, or other assignment), or the attempt to commit such an act” (Section 11-802 (b), *Institutional Rules on Student Services and Activities*).

If you have any questions about what constitutes scholastic dishonesty, you should consult with me and [this website](#). Any student that violates this policy will fail this course and have the details of the violation reported to Student Judicial Services.

### 4. Emergency evacuation policy.

In the event of a fire or other emergency, it may be necessary to evacuate a building rapidly. Upon the activation of a fire alarm or the announcement of an emergency in a university building, all occupants of the building are required to evacuate and assemble outside. Once evacuated, no one may re-enter the building without instruction to do so from the Austin Fire Department, University of Texas at Austin Police Department, or Fire Prevention Services office.

Students should familiarize themselves with all the exit doors of each room and building they occupy at the university, and should remember that the nearest exit routes may not be the same as the way they typically enter buildings.

Students requiring assistance in evacuation shall inform their instructors in writing during the first week of class. Faculty members must then provide this information to the Fire Prevention Services office by fax (512-232-2759), with “Attn. Mr. Roosevelt Easley” written in the subject line.

Information regarding emergency evacuation routes and emergency procedures can be found [here](#).

## Readings

Three books are required for this course:

- Stueck, William. 2004. *Rethinking the Korean War* Princeton University Press.
- McDonald, Patrick. 2009. *The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory* Cambridge University Press.
- Wolford, Scott. 2015. *The Politics of Military Coalitions* Cambridge University Press.

All other readings will be available electronically. I also expect that you will have completed the readings before the sessions for which they are assigned.

## Course Outline and Schedule

### Session 1. Introduction

#### *Required*

- Stueck, William. 2004. *Rethinking the Korean War* Princeton University Press.

### Session 2. Bargaining and War

#### *Required*

- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49:379-414.
- Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60:169-203.
- Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom and Wonjae Hwang. 2008. "War, Power, and Bargaining." *Journal of Politics* 70.4:1203-1216.
- Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2014. "Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War." *International Organization* 68.1:1-31.
- Bell, Sam R. and Jesse C. Johnson. 2015. "Shifting Power, Commitment Problems, and Preventive War." *International Studies Quarterly* 59.1:124-132.

#### *Recommended*

- Morrow, James D. 1989. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science* 33:941-972.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games." *American Journal of Political Science* 34.3:499-614.
- Morgan, T. Clifton. 1994. *Untying the Knot of War: A Bargaining Theory of International Crises* University of Michigan Press.
- Powell, Robert. 1999. *In The Shadow of Power* Princeton University Press.
- Powell, Robert. 2002. "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:1-30.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States." *American Political Science Review* 97.1:123-133.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2007. *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics* University of Michigan Press.

- Leventoğlu, Bahar and Ahmer Tarar. 2008. "Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?" *International Studies Quarterly* 52.3:533-553.
- Meirowitz, Adam and Anne E. Sartori. 2008. "Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3:327-352.
- Chadeaux, Thomas. 2011. "Bargaining Over Power: When do Shifts in Power Lead to War?" *International Theory* 20.3:228-253.
- Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2011. "Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power." *International Studies Quarterly* 55.4:1003-1023.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. and Ahmer Tarar. 2011. "Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.1:135-148.
- Fey, Mark and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2012. "Uncertainty and Incentives and Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.1:149-169.
- Fey, Mark, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2013. "Credibility and Commitment in Crisis Bargaining." *Political Science Research and Methods* 1.1:27-52.
- Tarar, Ahmer. 2013. "Military Mobilization and Commitment Problems." *International Interactions* 39.3:343-366.
- Arena, Philip and Kyle A. Joyce. n.d. "Challenges to Inference in the Study of Crisis Bargaining." *Political Science Research and Methods* Forthcoming. [[Link](#)]

### **Session 3. Communication and Signaling**

#### *Required*

- Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41.1:68-90.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2000. "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation." *International Organization* 54.2:325-357.
- Sartori, Anne E. 2002. "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes." *International Organization* 56.1:121-149.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2004. "Rational Appeasement." *International Organization* 58.2:345-373.
- Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2013. "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China." *International Organization* 67.1:1-35.

#### *Recommended*

- Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence* Yale University Press.

- Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images in International Relations* Princeton University Press.
- Nalebuff, Barry. 1991. "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World." *World Politics* 43.3:313-335.
- Kydd, Andrew. 1997. "Game Theory and the Spiral Model." *World Politics* 49.3:371-400.
- Zagare, Frank, and Marc Kilgour. 2000. *Perfect Deterrence* Cambridge University Press.
- Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith. 2002. "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46.2:175-200.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2005. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* Princeton University Press.
- Sartori, Anne E. 2005. *Deterrence by Diplomacy* Princeton University Press.
- Favretto, Katja. 2009. "Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion and Bias." *American Political Science Review* 103.2:248-263.
- Rider, Toby J. 2009. "Understanding Arms Race Onset: Rivalry, Threat, and Territorial Competition." *Journal of Politics* 71.2:693-703.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2010. "Feigning Weakness." *International Organization* 64.2:357-388.
- Trager, Robert F. 2010. "Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters." *American Political Science Review* 104.2:347-368.
- Tingley, Dustin H. and Barbara F. Walter. 2011. "Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.6:996-1020.

#### **Session 4. Reputations and War**

##### *Required*

- Nalebuff, Barry. 1991. "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World." *World Politics* 43.3:313-335.
- Wolford, Scott. 2007. "The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4:772-788.
- Clare, Joe and Vesna Danilovic. 2010. "Multiple Audiences and Reputation Building in International Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54.6:860-882.

- Weisiger, Alex and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2015. "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics." *International Organization* 69.2:473-495.
- Wu, Cathy Xuanxuan and Scott Wolford. n.d. "Informational Traps, Reputation-Building, and International War." Typescript, University of Texas.

*Recommended*

- Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence* Yale University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images in International Relations* Princeton University Press.
- Hopf, Ted. 1994. *Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990* University of Michigan Press.
- Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. *Reputation and International Politics* Cornell University Press.
- Huth, Paul K. 1997. "Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment." *Security Studies* 7.1:72-99.
- O'Neill, Barry. 1999. *Honor, Symbols, and War* University of Michigan Press.
- Danilovic, Vesna. 2002. *When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers* University of Michigan Press.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2004. "Rational Appeasement." *International Organization* 58.2:345-373.
- Press, Daryl G. 2005. *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* Cornell University Press.
- Sartori, Anne E. 2005. *Deterrence by Diplomacy* Princeton University Press.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2006. "Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others." *American Journal of Political Science* 50.2:313-330.
- Crescenzi, Mark J.C. 2007. "Reputation and Interstate Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.2:382-396.
- Gibler, Douglas M. 2008. "The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52.3:426-454.
- Sechser, Todd S. 2010. "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power." *International Organization* 64.4:627-660.
- Tingley, Dustin H. and Barbara F. Walter. 2011. "The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation-Building: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 65.2:343-365.

- Clare, Joe and Vesna Danilovic. 2012. "Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29.1:3-27.
- Dafoe, Allan, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. 2014. "Reputation and Status as Motives for War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17:371-393.

### **Session 5. Arming, Arms Races, and War**

#### *Required*

- Morrow, James D. 1989. "A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33.3:500-529.
- McGinnis, Michael. 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35.3:443-473.
- Powell, Robert. 1993. "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy." *American Political Science Review* 87.1:115-132.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2000. "Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective." *American Journal of Political Science* 44.2:228-244.
- Rider, Toby J. 2013. "Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races." *International Studies Quarterly* 57.3:580-591.

#### *Recommended*

- Intriligator, Michael D. and Dagobert L. Brito. 1984. "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28.1:63-84.
- Brito, Dagobert L. and Michael D. Intriligator. 1985. "Conflict, War, and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 79.4:943-957.
- Diehl, Paul F. and Jean Kingston. 1987. "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 49.4:189-799.
- Lichbach, Mark. 1993. "Stability in Richardson's Arms Races and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Arms Rivalries." *American Journal of Political Science* 33.4:1016-1047.
- Vasquez, John A. 1993. *The War Puzzle* Cambridge University Press.
- Hess, G.D. 1995. "An Introduction to Lewis Fry Richardson and His Mathematical Theory of War and Peace." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 14.1:77-113.
- Diehl, Paul F. and Marc J.C. Crescenzi. 1998. "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate." *Journal of Peace Research* 35.1:111-118.



- Sample, Susan G. 1998. "Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42.2:156-175.
- Glaser, Charles. 2004. "When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming." *International Security* 28.1:44-84.
- Gibler, Douglas M., Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchison. 2005. "Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry." *Journal of Peace Research* 42.2:131-147.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises." *American Political Science Review* 99.4:533-547.
- Rider, Toby J. 2009. "Understanding Arms Race Onset: Rivalry, Threat, and Territorial Competition." *Journal of Politics* 71.2:693-703.
- Rider, Toby J., Michael G. Findley, and Paul F. Diehl. 2011. "Just Part of the Game? Arms Races, Rivalry, and War." *Journal of Peace Research* 48.1:85-100.
- Arena, Philip and Scott Wolford. 2012. "Arms, Intelligence, and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 56.2:351-365.

## **Session 6. *The Democratic Peace***

### *Required*

- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1993. "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 87.3:624-638.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 93.4:781-807.
- Gibler, Douglas M. 2007. "Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 51.3:509-532.
- Henderson, Errol A. 2009. "Disturbing the Peace: African Welfare, Political Inversion, and the Universality of the Democratic Peace Thesis." *British Journal of Political Science* 39.1:25-58.
- McDonald, Patrick. 2015. "Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace." *International Organization* 69.3:557-588.

### *Recommended*

- Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth. 1996. "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88." *American Political Science Review* 90.3:512-533.

- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92.2:377-389.
- Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace* W.W. Norton & Co.
- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. *Democracies at War* Princeton University Press.
- Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97.4:585-602.
- Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2004. "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcome." *American Journal of Political Science* 48:296-313.
- Slantchev, Branislav L., Anna Alexandrova, and Erik Gartzke. 2005. "Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 99.3:459-462.
- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.1:166-191.
- Debs, Alexandre, and H.E. Goemans. 2010. "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War." *American Political Science Review* 104.3:430-445.
- Dafoe, Allan. 2011. "Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.2:247-262.
- Gibler, Douglas M. 2012. *The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and International Conflict* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fearon, James D. n.d. "A Simple Political Economy of Relations Among Democracies and Autocracies." [\[Link\]](#)
- Arena, Philip. 2015. "Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27.1:108-131.

### **Session 7. Audience Costs**

#### *Required*

- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88:577-592.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. "Looking for Audience Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45.1:32-60.
- Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62.1:35-64.

- Snyder, Jack L. and Erica D. Borghard. 2011. "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound." *American Political Science Review* 105.3:437-456.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2012. "Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now." *Security Studies* 21.3:369-375.
- Kurizaki, Shuhei and Taehee Whang. n.d. "Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes." *International Organization* Forthcoming. [\[Link\]](#)

#### *Recommended*

- Smith, Alastair. 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics." *American Political Science Review* 92.3:623-638.
- Partell, Peter J., and Glenn Palmer. 1999. "Audience Costs and Interstate Crises." *International Studies Quarterly* 43.2:389-405.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* Cambridge University Press.
- Leventoğlu, Bahar and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. "Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining." *American Political Science Review* 99.3:419-433.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2006. "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs." *International Studies Quarterly* 50.2:445-477.
- Kurizaki, Shuhei. 2007. "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy." *American Political Science Review* 101.3:543-558.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61.4:821-840.
- Tarar, Ahmer and Bahar Leventoğlu. 2009. "Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining." *International Studies Quarterly* 53.3:817-839.
- Trager, Robert F., and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.3:526-545.
- Downes, Alexander B., and Todd S. Sechser. 2012. "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility." *International Organization* 66.3:457-489.
- Levendusky, Matthew S., and Michael C. Horowitz. 2012. "When Backing Down is the Right Decision." *Journal of Politics* 74.2:323-338.
- Tarar, Ahmer and Bahar Leventoğlu. 2013. "Limited Audience Costs in International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57.6:1065-1089.

### **Session 8. National Leaders and International Conflict**

### *Required*

- Chiozza, Giacomo and Hein Goemans. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48.3:604-619.
- Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2009. "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy." *International Security* 34.2:119-161.
- Debs, Alexandre and H.E. Goemans. 2010. "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War." *American Political Science Review* 104.3:430-445.
- Wolford, Scott. 2012. "Incumbents, Successors, and Crisis Bargaining: Leadership Turnover As a Commitment Problem." *Journal of Peace Research* 49.4:517-530.
- Colgan, Jeff D. and Lessica L.P. Weeks. 2015. "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict." *International Organization* 69.1:163-194.

### *Recommended*

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regimes and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 89.4:841-855.
- Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival* MIT Press.
- Horowitz, Michael, Rose McDermott, and Allan C. Stam. 2005. "Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49.5:661-685.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59.1:1-38.
- Wolford, Scott. 2007. "The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4:772-788.
- Arena, Philip. 2008. "Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25:136-151.
- McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2008. *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change* Princeton University Press.
- Goemans, Hein and Mark Fey. 2009. "Risky But Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble." *Journal of Politics* 71.1:35-54.
- Licht, Amanda A. 2010. "Coming Into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Tenure." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54.1:58-87.
- Park, Jong Hee. 2010. "Structural Change in U.S. Presidents' Use of Force." *American Journal of Political Science* 54.3:766-782.

- Chiozza, Giacomo and Goemans, Hein. 2011. *Leaders and International Conflict* Cambridge University Press.
- Croco, Sarah E. 2011. "The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment." *American Political Science Review* 105.3:457-477.
- Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2011. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions* Cornell University Press.
- Weeks, Jessica L.P. 2012. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 106.2:326-347.
- Colgan, Jeff D. 2013. "Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict." *World Politics* 65.4:656-690.
- Weeks, Jessica L.P. 2014. *Dictators at War and Peace* Cornell University Press.

## **Session 9. Economics and War**

### *Required*

- McDonald, Patrick. 2009. *The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory* Cambridge University Press.
- Chapman, Terrence L., Patrick J. McDonald, and Scott Moser. 2015. "The Domestic Politics of Strategic Retrenchment, Power Shifts, and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 59.1:133-144.

### *Recommended*

- Gowa, Joanne. 1995. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade* Princeton University Press.
- Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore. 2003. *The Size of Nations* MIT Press.
- Bearce, David H. 2003. "Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace." *International Studies Quarterly* 47.3:347-370.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power and International Competition." *International Organization* 57.1:3-42.
- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.1:166-191.
- Polachek, Solomon, and Jun Xiang. 2010. "How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game." *International Organization* 64.1:133-144.

- Gartzke, Erik and Alex Weisiger. 2014. "Under Construction: Development, Democracy, and Difference as Determinants of Systemic Liberal Peace." *International Studies Quarterly* 58.1:130-145.
- Dafoe, Allan. 2011. "Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.2:247-262.
- Shea, Patrick E. 2013. "Financing Victory: Sovereign Credit, Democracy, and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58.5:771-795.
- Poast, Paul. 2015. "Central Banks at War." *International Organization* 69.1:63-95.

### **Session 10. Nuclear Weapons**

#### *Required*

- Powell, Robert. 1988. "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information." *American Political Science Review* 82.1:155-178.
- Gartzke, Erik and Dong-Joon Jo. 2009. "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53.2:209-233.
- Fuhrmann, Matthew and Sarah E. Kreps. 2010. "Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54.6:831-859.
- Kroenig, Matthew. 2013. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes." *International Organization* 67.1:141-171.
- Sechser, Todd S. and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail." *International Organization* 67.1:173-195.
- Powell, Robert. 2015. "Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power." *International Organization* 69.3:589-626.

#### *Recommended*

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