

# A Theory of Neutrality Rights in War

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# Question

How (if at all) can the laws of war affect state behavior?

# Motivation

Laws govern behavior between

- Co-belligerents (POWs, civilians, violence)
  - ▶ Threats of reciprocity
  - ▶ (Morrow 2002, 2007; Wallace 2012; Valentino et al. 2006)
- Belligerents and third parties (neutrality)
  - ▶ Threats of *intervention*
  - ▶ Where this paper comes in

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# Theory

- Theory of international law
  - ▶ Coordinates expectations on unacceptable behavior and response (Morrow 2002)
  - ▶ May also reduce costs of intervention (cf. Voeten 2005)
- Theory of war expansion
  - ▶ Intervention *desirable* against expansionist states
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# The Model

- Players: belligerent ( $B$ ), third party ( $A$ )
- Belligerent honors or violates neutrality
  - ▶ military boost at some cost  $c_B$
  - ▶ expansionist  $\underline{c}_B$  values violation more than satiable type  $\bar{c}_B$
  - ▶  $\underline{c}_B < \bar{c}_B$
- Third party joins war or not
  - ▶ would like to fight expansionist but not satiable type
  - ▶ uncertain over belligerent's type
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for generic  $c_B$ ,

$$u_B = \begin{cases} (\rho + b) & \text{if } (h, n) \\ (\rho + b - a) & \text{if } (h, j) \\ (\rho\lambda + b) - c_B & \text{if } (v, n) \\ (\rho\lambda + b - a) - c_B & \text{if } (v, n) \end{cases}$$

$$u_A = \begin{cases} (\rho + b) u_A(c_B) & \text{if } (h, n) \\ (\rho + b - a) u_A(c_B) - c_A & \text{if } (h, j) \\ (\rho\lambda + b) u_A(c_B) & \text{if } (v, n) \\ (\rho\lambda + b - a) u_A(c_B) - dc_A & \text{if } (v, n) \end{cases}$$


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
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
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


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




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# Analysis

## Three types of equilibrium

- No law / opportunistic violation → both types violate\*
- Full compliance / pooling → no type violates
- Separating → only expansionist violates

## Two types of effect

- Equilibrium selection
- Equilibrium replacement

... but both depend on opportunistic defection existing as well

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
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
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expansionist type's cost for violating neutrality ( $\underline{c}_B$ )




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
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# Implications

1. Effect greatest when expansionism believed rare.
2. Violations facilitate **desirable** interventions b/c only expansionists violate.
  - “punishment” spurious to desirable intervention
  - compliance a poor standard?
3. More powerful 3rd parties more prone to regretted neutrality.
4. Violations independently increase chances of war expansion.

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- Law of neutrality are unique
  - ▶ govern behavior b/w belligerents and non-belligerents
- Integrated theories of law and war expansion
- Deterrence vs. solving information problems
- Implications for
  - ▶ Judging “effectiveness”
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Questions? Comments?

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