Power, Preferences, and Balancing:
Erratum

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Abstract

Figure 3 in Wolford (2014), which plots predicted probabilities of third-party opposition in international crises, presents confidence intervals that lack the proper transformation appropriate for the probit model used to generate them. In this brief erratum, I present the same figure with properly calculated confidence intervals and show that the substantive interoperation of the empirical results are the same. I also present the game tree that was left out of the published version for space considerations.
Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Opposition and 95% Confidence Intervals by Coalitional Power and Diversity of Coalitional Interests

References

Figure 2: The sequence of moves and payoffs

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{intervene} \quad \text{neutral} \\
N \quad \hat{c}_p \quad c_p \quad 0 \\

\begin{array}{c}
\text{stay} \\
\text{leave}
\end{array}
\quad \begin{array}{c}
(1 - \hat{p}_{LP}, (1 - m)u_O(C, I) - c_O, \beta u_P(O, I) - c_P) \\
(1 - m)u_O(C, I) - c_O, 0)
\end{array}

\begin{array}{c}
\text{stay} \\
\text{leave}
\end{array}
\quad \begin{array}{c}
(1, 0) \\
((1 - m)u_O(L, I) - c_O, 0)
\end{array}

\begin{array}{c}
\text{stay} \\
\text{leave}
\end{array}
\quad \begin{array}{c}
(u_O(C, N), \beta u_P(O, N) - c_P) \\
(u_O(L, N), 0)
\end{array}

\end{align*}
\]